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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented at the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University 




















































































































































































Article 82 of the Draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union provides:
This Treaty shall be open for ratification by all the 
Member States of the European Communities.
Once this Treaty has been ratified by a majority of the 
Member States of the , Communities whose population 
represents two-thirds of the total population of the 
Communities, the governments of the Member States which 
have ratified shall meet at once to decide by common 
accord on the procedures by and the date on which this 
Treaty shall enter into force.(1)
By contrast, Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome provides that
The Government of any Member State or the Commission may 
submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of 
this Treaty.
If the Council, after consulting in Assembly and, where 
appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in 
favour of calling a conference of representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States, the conference shall 
be convened by the President of the Council for the 
purpose of determining by common accord the amendments 
to be made to this Treaty.
The amendments shall enter into force after being 
ratified by all the Member States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements.(2)
The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union is not, of 
course, the first international treaty which foresees the 
possibility of only partial ratification by Member States of 
the European Community.(3) The Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union, however, departs dramatically from the past 



























































































drafted, as a "successor" to the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities, not a subsidiary treaty existing within 
the framework of the Treaty of Rome. The High Contracting 
Parties are defined, in the Preamble, as the Member States 
of the European Communities, and it is difficult to envision 
the Union established by the Draft Treaty —  as presently 
formulated —  co-existing with the current EC.
The unique character of the Draft Treaty gives rise to a 
formal legal problem regarding the procedure established for 
its adoption. For if, as it seems at first blush, the Draft 
Treaty amounts to a massive amendment of the EC Treaties, the 
adoption and entry into force of the new may be incompatible 
with the revision provisions of the old. If, in the 
alternative, the Draft Treaty is not an amendment of the 
Community Treaties but a new treaty replacing them, we shall 
see that its adoption would still raise problems under public 
international law in the event that not all Member States 
adhere, and this interpretation entails other risks to the 
Community acquis.
In concrete terms, the question is whether the Member States 
of the Community may legally adopt the Draft Treaty otherwise 




























































































Some subsidiary problems relating to Article 82(DT).
The terms of Article 82(DT) leave unresolved the final steps 
that will bring the Treaty into force. Article 82(DT) does 
not provide, as many treaties do, for automatic entry into 
force upon deposit of a preestablished number of 
ratifications. It provides, instead, that "the governments of 
the Member States... shall meet at once to decide by common 
accord on the procedures by ... which this Treaty shall enter 
into force." The need for a new common accord before entry 
into force leaves the parties some room to manouver as they 
seek to complete the transition from European Community to 
European Union.(4) Strictly speaking, from a legal point of 
view, the ratifying Member States would not be undertaking 
the obligations contained in the Draft Treaty itself, but the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith on the procedures by 
which and the time at which the Draft Treaty would enter into 
force.
This provision, clearly the result of a compromise, offers an 
important politico-legal advantage: it enables governments 
and parliaments to ratify the Draft Treaty, or a modified 
version thereof, without facing immediately the problem of 
the legality of non-unanimous adherence. Put more starkly, 




























































































albeit legalistically, that Article 82(DT) violates neither 
Community nor international law because it does not, by 
itself, provide for the Draft Treaty's entry into force.
After ratification by the required majority, it is possible 
that non-adhering states would seek to negotiate an accord 
with the adhering states that would allow the Draft Treaty to 
be brought into force. One might even add that a Member 
State that ratified could refuse to bring the Draft Treaty 
into force, without violating the requirement of negotiating 
in good faith, if such an accord could not be reached.
This legal construction, however, only defers the real issue. 
In spite of its ambiguity, Article 82(DT) clearly foresees 
the Draft Treaty entering into force pursuant to a procedure 
which deviates from Article 236(EEC) and, in theory, even 
against the will of up to four Member States. Apparently, the 
very procedure of entry into force of the Draft Treaty could, 
especially if only some Member States take the plunge, be 
tainted with illegality under Community law.
The Relevance of the Issue
The issue of the legality of the adoption procedure will 
arise, under one guise or another, in any future 




























































































merits discussion regardless of the prospects of the Draft 
Treaty. Be that as it may, to many this issue might seem in 
some ways politically irrelevant: the type of legalism which 
gives lawyers a bad name. After all, should the required 
"political will" to adopt the Draft Treaty -- or an amended 
version thereof -- emerge, that kind of legalism will 
probably be brushed aside. Indeed, as we shall see below, 
even during the life of the EEC itself there have been Treaty 
amendments which did not respect the revision procedure ex 
Article 236(EEC). By contrast, in the absence of the 
necessary "political will," this issue might assume a certain 
theological air, like the question of how many angels can 
dance on the head of a pin.
And yet we believe that in the Community, this seemingly 
hairsplitting legalism partakes of an important political 
dimension —  greater perhaps than it could in other 
international-treaty-based entities. The so-called "primacy 
of politics" in the issues surrounding such a dramatic shift 
in the architecture of Europe may add such a political 
dimension even to purely legal issues; especially in light of 
the unique role that law (and, alas, lawyers) have come to 
play in the Community. We propose to digress briefly to 





























































































The Prominence of Law in the European Community Process
Many have noted the striking and even excessive importance 
which legal questions assume in the EEC.(5) This state of 
affairs is due to a number of factors. In particular one may 
mention the following five considerations:
1. At the risk of stating the obvious, the Community was and 
is a creature of law. When a nation-state adopts or changes a 
Constitution there is a more-or-less organic socio-political 
entity to which that Constitution applies. There would be a 
"France" with or without, say, the 1958 Constitution; there 
would be an Italy or a Germany with or without their Post-War 
constitutions.(6)
Even today, over thirty years since its inception, there 
would not be a European Community without the Treaties. 
Removal of a very few legal provisions would signal the end 
of the Community; it will be a long time yet before the 
Community assumes an organic gocial-economic-political 
identity apart from its legal framework.
2. The European Court of Justice and its astute use of 
Article 177(EEC) introduced the rule of law into Community 
life in a manner which has no precedent in other 




























































































final decisions based on transnational and uniform 
interpretation of the Treaties (and that governments can 
hardly disobey their own courts) has grafted onto the Member 
States a habit of obedience to European Law which is more 
usually associated with national law.
3. Soldiers are often told that "I can't" is the cousin of "I 
don't want to." In the Community this maxim often applies 
when the Member States complain: "I can't." Legal argument 
has a role here. like, in his influential How Nations 
Negotiate explains: In negotiations a
way of expressing firmness is to maintain that one's 
positions accord with legal or scientific principle... 
this is the principal function of legal ... argument; 
for you do not usually make your proposal more 
attractive to your opponent by telling him that what you 
are proposing is in accordance with ... international 
law. However, if you make your opponent believe that you 
think your proposal is grounded on such principles, you 
may have conveyed to him that your proposal is firm.(7)
We may add that in the Community the reverse is even more 
true: the legal argument is a wonderful excuse for the claim, 
"I want to but I can't."
4. The open-textured, almost constitutional nature of the 
Treaty makes legal interpretation central to the Community's 
development. Policy arguments masked as legal arguments 




























































































5. Finally, the Community system displays a much higher level 
of constitutional-legal integration than institutional- 
political integration. Law often performs functions which in 
other polities may belong to the political sphere.(8)
These factors help to explain why any legal argument in the 
Community, especially over controversial issues, may assume a 
significance out of proportion to its apparent political 
importance. In the particular case of the Draft Treaty, we 
would single out two distinct considerations:
Assuming that the procedure for adoption of the Draft Treaty 
ex Article 82(DT) could be considered illegal, this legal 
fact would in our view have important political consequences. 
Although it is true that unanimous Member State political 
will would remove much of the urgency from the issue of 
procedural legality, it is more likely that, at least at 
first, only some of the Member States, if any, will favour 
the Draft Treaty enterprise. Others may display disinterest, 
even hostility. The legal argument will, I expect, become one 
of the tools which might be used by those governments opposed 
to the venture. Even more likely, a popular movement in 
favor of European integration along the lines of the Draft 
Treaty, combined with the European Parliament's relatively 
strong support, might embarass hostile governments, in at 




























































































unable to voice open opposition. It might be politically 
convenient for governments, or political parties, to make 
supportive noises while searching for excuses for avoiding 
decisive action. An argument based on the "need to respect 
the legal and constitutional requirement solemnised in the 
Treaty of Rome" as an obstructionist or delaying tactic is 
almost tailor made for this kind of ambivalent political 
situation.
The second political consideration inherent in the legal 
issue derives in a way from the first. Sensitive to the risk 
that the Draft Treaty's political opponents may hide behind 
legal objections to the proposed implementation procedure, 
the Treaty's promoters tend, understandably, to go to great 
analytical lengths to find legal justifications for departing 
from Article 236(EEC), especially in situations where not all 
the Member States adhere to the new order. As we shall see, 
much of this discussion relies on international law 
interpretations of the Treaty of Rome. It implicitly 
undermines some of the constitutional underpinnings which the 
European Court of Justice has attributed to the 
Community.(9) We do not think that the battle for the Draft 
Treaty establishing the European Union should be fought at 
the expense of the Community. The danger here (admittedly, 
the word "danger" betrays a value judgment) is that 




























































































existing structure of the EEC and damage certain hard-won 
principles concerning the political-legal nature of the 
Community.
The Entry into Force of the Draft Treaty; Two Basic Scenarios
In this analysis of the legal-political issue of treaty 
revision, we will distinguish two legally and politically 
distinct situations. In the first scenario, all Member 
States decide to adhere to the Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union, or a modified version thereof. In the second, 
not all of the Member States decide to adhere. The second 
scenario presupposes a higher degree of political controversy 
and entails some additional grounds for legal opposition. We 
propose to examine several legal constructs through which the 
adoption procedure as currently embodied in Article 82 may be 
viewed. We will not attempt to "adjudicate" any of these 
constructs. They are presented merely as a basis for 
discussion.
The First Scenario —  All Member States Decide to Adhere
Let us assume, then, that all the Member States decide to 
adhere to the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, 
or a modified version thereof. Under this scenario we assume 




























































































join the Union. Thus, we will not discuss, at this point, 
the relational problems of the Union and the Community; our 
principal concern is actually the procedure itself.
Legal Construct No. 1; The Member States pursue the formal 
procedures provided in Article 236(EEC). Legally, of course, 
this would be the neatest avenue for obviating the juridical 
issues. The problem is political: Article 236(EEC) envisages 
a pathetic role for the European Parliament —  it is to be 
consulted only on the possibility of convening an 
intergovernmental conference. Parliament does not play a 
substantive role. Moreover, we have proof in the recent 
dismembering of the Genscher-Colombo Draft European Act that 
intergovernmental negotiations, at this point in time, are 
not conducive to radical change. The Genscher-Colombo 
proposal, unworthy of the name of European Union, was far 
less innovative than the present Draft Treaty, yet even that 
proposal was reduced to the anemic Solemn Declaration. The 
possible fate of the current Draft Treaty may be imagined.
It may, nevertheless, be possible to continue the current 
mobilization process and political negotiations of the Draft 
Treaty establishing the European Union and then, once accord 
is reached, have the Member States go through the motions of 




























































































principle, it is not foreseen in Article 82(DT); we must 
confront the legality of that provision as it stands.
Legal Construct No. 2: The Member States reach accord and 
proceed to ratification without respect for Article 236(EEC). 
As already indicated, political accord would take the urgency 
out of the legal argument. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile for 
two reasons to discuss this construct as well: (a) an attack 
on the procedure favoured by Parliament could be based inter 
alia on legal arguments; and (b) brief analysis of the issues 
under this construct will shed light on other more complex 
ones .
On its face, the procedure of Article 82(DT) seems 
incompatible with Community law. One way of overcoming this 
difficulty is to invoke the international legal basis of the 
Community. In spite of its constitutional aspects, the Treaty 
of Rome arguably remains an international legal instrument 
subject, at least for some purposes, to the traditional rules 
of treaty interpretation. On this premise it is not difficult 
to find precedents in international practice for 
organizational revision which disregards the organic revision 
clauses.(10) If we adopt the view that the Draft Treaty 
amounts not to an amendment of the EEC Treaty but to a new 
treaty replacing it, we could argue that Article 236 does not 




























































































of Article 82(DT) need be judged only under public 
international law. In this case, the problem could be neatly 
solved. Article 59 of the Vienna Convention, which to the 
extent that it represents a codification of customary law is 
binding even on non-parties, provides that
A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the 
parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the 
same subject-matter and: (a) it appears from the later 
treaty or is otherwise established that the parties 
intended that the matter should be governed by that 
treaty...
If, by contrast, we adopt the view that the Draft Treaty 
amounts to a massive amendment of the EC treaties, 
international law once again appears to raise no doubts about 
the Draft Treaty's validity, since all Member States, under 
this scenario, have agreed to the amendment.
What, however, of Community law?
There are well-known precedents in the history of the 
Community itself in which amendments to the Community 
Treaties were adopted without recourse to the relevant 
amendment procedures.(11) The force of these precedents 
depends on their status under Community law. It would appear 
that these precedents were more than anything else an early 




























































































commentators(12) and, by implication, by the Court of 
Justice.
The Court of Justice, indeed, struck down a Community measure 
approved by the Commission and the Council, unanimously, for 
violation of a procedural requirement perhaps less important 
than Article 236(EEC).(13) It goes without saying that in 
Roquette Frères the rights of the European Parliament were 
violated, and that is not the case here. Other interests, 
however, are involved as well.(14) Article 236(EEC) foresees 
a positive role for the Council and the Commission. Though 
the Council's interests may be satisfied by unanimous 
agreement of the Member States, the Commission's interests 
seem still to be violated. Because Article 236 requires an 
opinion from the Commission only "where appropriate," there 
is some room to maintain that the Commission has no absolute 
rights to be violated under Article 82(DT). Furthermore, the 
"citizen of the Community" has rights that must be protected, 
apart from those of the Member States and the Community 
Institutions. Courts should, in principle, protect such 
"constitutional" rights from violation even by parliaments. 
Still, neither Article 236(EEC) nor Article 82(DT) requires a 
Community-wide referendum; thus, if all Member State 
parliaments ratify the Draft Treaty, the Community citizen's 
interests are protected as well under the Draft Treaty as 




























































































In conclusion, within the framework of Community law, even 
unanimity might not suffice to legitimate a procedural 
deviation from Article 236(EEC). If this were not the case, 
each time the Member States jointly decided to violate the 
Treaty they could claim that the violation constituted a 
unanimous amendment of the Treaty. Plainly, international 
law should not be allowed to prevail here.
Legal Construct No. 3: A third approach to the problem of 
implementing the Draft Treaty would be for all the Member 
States to withdraw from the EEC and then adopt the Draft 
Treaty in accordance with the terms of Article 82(DT). The 
arguments used above to explain a unanimous disregard of 
Article 236(EEC) apply with even greater force to a unanimous 
decision to withdraw. The Draft Treaty's emphasis on 
continuity between the Community and the proposed European 
Union, however, suggests that its authors did not envision 
such a tactic.(15) Furthermore, it smacks of legal 
artificiality. Even a legal fiction may serve to disarm 
opponents of the Draft Treaty who might use legal objections 
as an excuse for their opposition, but it cannot fully supply 
the moral authority we seek from the law. This option, in 
any event, will be considered more fully below, in our 
discussion of the second scenario.




























































































Until now we have assumed that all the Member States of the 
Community decide to adhere to the Draft Treaty, or some 
modified form thereof. This hypothesis is politically 
unlikely, but has the virtue of simplifying the issues before 
us. If, as is probable, one or more Member States decline to 
join the European Union, the legal issues discussed above, 
neutralized by political agreement under the first scenario, 
will become weapons in the hands of the Draft Treaty's 
opponents. Moreover, partial adherence would raise new legal 
issues regarding the rights of non-adhering Member States 
under the EC treaties and the possible coexistence of the 
Union and the Community.
Let us deal first with the claim that the Draft Treaty 
constitutes not an amendment to the EC Treaties but a 
replacement of them, so that Article 236(EEC) does not apply. 
Although this interpretation is appealing at first sight it 
raises several problems and dangers.
In the first place it destroys the constitutionalization of 
the EC Treaties that the Court of Justice has achieved over 
the years in collaboration with national courts. It 
reconstrues the EC Treaties in purely international legal 
terms--a step that is legally dubious from the point of view 
of Community law and retrograde from the point of view of the 




























































































Secondly, remembering that under the second scenario only a 
majority of the Member States want to create the European 
Union, it suggests that in the future a majority of the 
Member States might adopt another treaty abolishing the EEC 
or, should the Draft Treaty be adopted, the European Union, 
by claiming likewise that it "replaces" the Draft Treaty, as 
finally adopted. In other words, it opens the possibility of 
withdrawal by one or more Member States from the European 
Community, a possibility we discuss and reject in Legal 
Construct No. 4. Worse still, it provides the majority with 
a means to "kick out" the minority. In addition, it may 
become very difficult to draw the line between amendment and 
replacement. In this context, it is interesting to note that 
even the Draft Treaty requires unanimity for amendment (Art. 
84) .
Finally, and fatally, even if the requirements of Article 
236(EEC) can be avoided under this construction, we must face 
the requirements of public international law. It is clear, 
for example, from Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, that a 
group of states party to a multilateral convention cannot 
avoid their obligations to other contracting parties simply 
by concluding a new treaty among themselves. Since the 
provisions of the Draft Treaty are clearly incompatable with 




























































































not an amendment to but a replacement of the EC Treaties-- 
does not clearly resolve our legal difficulties but 
demonstrably damages the Community acquis.
Legal Construct No. 4 : If it would be illegal, prima facie, 
for only some of the Member States to adhere to the Draft 
Treaty, it might be possible for those states to withdraw 
from the Community before concluding the European Union. 
This solution, which would have an air of artificiality when 
practised by all the Member States together, would have 
enormous practical and political consequences if only six or 
seven Member States withdrew. In that case, the legality of 
withdrawal would become much more than a legal quibble.
First there is the strict legal issue. Commentators differ 
sharply on the legality, under Community law, of unilateral 
withdrawal. The Treaty of Rome does not provide explicitly 
one way or the other, though Article 240 declares that"/t/his 
Treaty is concluded for an unlimited period."(16) Some 
writers maintain that this article necessarily precludes 
unilateral withdrawal(17); others note that the failed 
European Political Community treaty was defined as 
"indissoluble," a much stronger term than "unlimited 
period."(18) Under this reading, therefore, Article 240 
might indicate only the Member States' intention to 




























































































the ECSC Treaty, which was limited to 50 years. Thus, the 
term "unlimited period" means merely "not limited to any 
specific duration," rather than "perpetual."(19) The Court 
of Justice has hinted that it favors the former view, though 
it has not, of course, confronted the question squarely. In 
the case of Commission v. France, France maintained that 
Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty lapsed when the Council 
failed to confirm or amend them within the time specified in 
Article 76. Rejecting this interpretation, the Court stated:
The Member States agreed to establish a Community of 
unlimited duration, having permanent institutions vested 
with real powers, stemming from a limitation of authority 
or a transfer of powers from the States to that 
Community.
Powers thus conferred could not, therefore, be withdrawn 
from the Community, nor could the objectives with which 
such powers are concerned be restored to the field of 
authority of the Member States alone, except by virtue 
of an express provision of the Treaty.
To admit that the whole of Chapter VI lapsed without any 
new provisions simultaneously coming into force would 
amount to accepting a break in continuity in a sphere 
where the Treaty, particularly by Article 2, has 
prescribed the pursuit of a common policy.(20)
In the absence of a clear provision regarding withdrawal in 
the Treaty of Rome, or a definitive reply by the Court of 
Justice, Article 56(1) of the Vienna Convention comes into 
play.(21) Article 56(1) returns to the fundamental 
principle of treaty interpretation, the intention of the 
parties.(22) Some writers take the position that state




























































































provided for in the treaty in question unless the parties' 
intent is otherwise made very clear.(23) In essence, this 
view does not diverge from Article 56 of the Vienna 
Convention; it merely seeks to require a high degree of proof 
before right of withdrawal will be inferred. With respect to 
the Treaty of Rome, the different interpretations of Article 
240(EEC) cited above illustrate how uncertain is the evidence 
concerning the intention of its framers.
In summary, it is not clear whether the Member States 
adhering to the new Treaty could legally withdraw from the 
Community. The majority of commentators appears to agree that 
no right of unilateral withdrawal exists. It is possible to 
suggest that withdrawal by a majority of Member States should 
be treated differently under Community law than unilateral 
withdrawal. Although tempting, this proposal is unsupported 
by the case law of the Court of Justice and would open the 
disastorous possibility mentioned above, of a majority of 
Member States expelling the minority from the Community. In 
a political sense, of course, these objections may be 
irrelevant, as the British referendum on withdrawal from the 
EEC demonstrates. We are concerned, however, with the legal 
legitimacy of the new enterprise, and it would be 
inauspicious to appeal at the outset to the irrelevance of 
law. Even if there is a right of withdrawal from the 




























































































a tactic; the Community is a bird in the hand, the European 
Union is very much in the bush. Indeed, the main weakness of 
this argument is not legal; it is the risk of destroying the 
old with no assurance that it will be replaced by the new.
Legal Construct No. 5: To set the stage for our discussion of 
the fifth and sixth constructs, let us consider the possible 
consequences of a rigid application of Article 236 (EEC). 
Imagine that all the Member States, except Luxembourg, wish 
to adhere to the Draft Treaty.(24) Indeed, imagine that only 
a bare majority in the Luxembourg legislator opposes the 
move. Article 236 would, it appears, permit the 
representatives of no more than,say, 150000 persons to 
thwart, legally , the desires of all other Member States and 
their peoples. The result clearly offends common sense; but 
this intuition must be translated into a legal construct 
that permits the nonapplication of Article 236(EEC) in a 
situation, unlike the previous constructs, where some of the 
Member States insist on its application.
Some commentators seek to sidestep the legal problems of 
adopting a new treaty outside the amendment procedures 
established in the Treaty of Rome by characterizing the Draft 
Treaty as initiating a new legal order, instead of an 
amendment to the Treaty of Rome.(25) That approach is 




























































































adequately resolve the underlying issues. If we construe the 
Draft Treaty as a new agreement between the Member States 
rather than an amendment to the Treaty of Rome, we run square 
into another problem: that a group of Member States has no 
power, under Community law, to enter into "private 
arrangements" in relation to subject matters which come 
within the jurisdiction of the Community.(26)
If this were not the case one would run the danger of a 
scenario no less disturbing than the "recalcitrant 
Luxembourg." Imagine six Member States regrouping to 
introduce a new vision for Europe which would, say, 
strengthen the role of national governments in the Community 
and detract from the acquis. (The Genscher-Colombo initiative 
was also termed a Draft European Act.) Could these six 
states, simply by calling their amendment a new legal order, 
which it might well amount to, be able to escape, legally, 
the binding effect of Article 236(EEC)? With no more, the 
idea of a new legal order seems plausible in a situation of 
unanimity (construct number two) but problematic in a divided 
Community.
The situations outlined above, in which a tiny minority wants 
to block the will of a majority or a majority wants to 
circumvent Article 236(EEC) to undermine the goals of the 




























































































contend. They illustrate the need for legal principles(27) 
to differentiate situations in which a majority should or 
should not be allowed to act outside the framework of the 
Treaty of Rome.
Legal Construct No. 6: The search for the principles alluded 
to in Construct No. 5 takes us into that delicate and 
profound zone where constitutional principle merges into 
social reality and political theory. In elaborating such 
principles, we must be careful clearly to define the 
situations in which a majority should be free of the minority 
veto embodied in Article 236(EEC). That veto is a safeguard 
designed to protect the Community structure from 
dismemberment by majorities.
Before trying to delineate the parameters of these rare 
situations in which the Member States might legitimately 
consider deviating from Article 236(EEC), let us see if the 
"laboratories of law," history and comparative analysis, 
offer us any insight. Our legal training instructs us to look 
for precedents; the trans-legal character of our argument 
forces us to look to political theory. The history of 
constitutional reform in a nation-state cannot, by 
definition, constitute a precedent for international law on 




























































































light of the "quasi-federal" character of the Community, it 
is instructive to examine these precedents in some detail.
The first precedent, and the one that most closely fits the 
facts of recent years, is the transformation of the United 
States from a Confederation under the Articles of 
Confederation to a federal state under the Constitution. The 
Articles of Confederation were the fruit of a struggle 
between conservative elements who favored a strong central 
government and radicals who wanted to keep the central 
government as weak as possible.(28) In 1781, when the 
Articles were finally ratified by all the Colonies , the 
radicals had clearly carried the day. The Congress 
established by the Articles, not unlike the Council of 
Ministers, was composed of members appointed by the state 
legislatures,who acted on the states' instructions and could 
be recalled at will (Article 5). The Congress' jurisdiction 
was sharply limited, and it possessed no power to coerce 
states that disobeyed it. The Articles, like the Treaty of 
Rome, could be amended only by unanimous agreement of the 
states (Article 13).
During the six years between the ratification of the Articles 
of Confederation and the Constitutional Convention, the 
limitations of this decentralized system of government became 




























































































reorganisation when Virginia and Maryland entered into a 
commercial agreement, even though such agreements were 
forbidden by Article 6 of the Articles of Confederation.(30) 
They called a convention in Annapolis with the stated purpose 
of expanding this agreement, using it as a springboard for 
calling a Convention to thoroughly revise the Articles of 
Confederation, to take place in Philadelphia in 1787.(31)
Worried by these unilateral initiatives, Congress ratified 
the call for a convention in Philadelphia. Both the delegates 
to the Annapolis Convention and Congress called expressly for 
a convention to prepare amendments to the existing Articles 
of Confederation, to be submitted to Congress and then to the 
state legislatures in accordance with Article 13.(32)
When the Federal Convention of 1787 finally met, the 
delegates quickly convinced themselves that an entirely new 
Constitution, not merely amendments to the Articles of 
Confederation, was required. The Constitution they produced, 
unlike the Articles of Confederation, was to enter into 
effect when ratified by only a two-thirds majority of the 
states (Article 7). In fact, the Constitution did enter into 
effect without the states of North Carolina and Rhode Island, 
and the new Congress passed a statute imposing a tariff on 
goods from those states. The contrast between the relatively 




























































































called for both by the Annapolis delegates and Congress, and 
the Constitution, which was ratified outside the terms of 
Article 13, inevitably evokes the nearly simultaneous 
development in the Community of the Genscher-Colombo and the 
Crocodile initiatives.
The history of the Swiss Constitution of 1848 provides a 
similar, though not quite parallel, precedent. The prior 
Constitution, the Federal Pact of 1815, established a very 
weak central government, limited in its competences and 
without power to enforce any of its decisions against 
recalcitrant cantons. The Federal Pact, however, unlike the 
Articles of Confederation, contained no clause regarding
amendment. Nonetheless, a concerted effort to amend the Pact
was made in 1832. In the 1840' s, a series of religious
conflicts led to the formation of the Sonderbund, a
defensive league of seven predominantly Catholic cantons. 
Although the Sonderbund was arguably protected under the 
Federal Pact (Article 6), the Diet resolved to disband the 
league by force. The brief civil war that followed inflamed 
national feeling to the point that a renewed effort at 
Constitutional revision swept through the Diet and was 





























































































The Federal Pact provided no mechanism for amendment, but 
this lacuna has been interpreted as reflecting simply a tacit 
understanding that the Swiss Constitution could be amended 
only by unanimous consent of the cantons.(33) This view is 
borne out by the repeated attempts at revision and even by 
the objections of Switzerland's neighbors. Metternich 
objected in 1848 that the Federal Pact could not be amended 
by only a majority of the cantons and warned that 
international recognition of Switzerland's neutrality was 
contingent upon the terms of the Federal Pact.(34) He did 
not claim, significantly, that the Pact could not be modified 
at all, even though it contained no provision for amendment. 
This interpretation seemed to follow inevitably from the 
sovereignty of the cantons, as guaranteed in the Federal 
Pact. Thus, some delegates to the commission that prepared 
the 1832 revision proposal maintained that "le Pacte de 1815, 
traité d'alliance entre vingt-deux cantons souverains, ne 
pouvait etre valablement révisé que par la volonté 
concordante de tous ses signataires."(35) Their objection, 
based on an international law construction of a national 
constitution, is strikingly pertinent today. Adoption of the 
1848 Constitution by a majority of the cantons may be seen as 





























































































The adoption of the American Constitution and the Swiss 
Constitution of 1848 furnish telling precedents for the 
current situation. To be sure, these precedents do not 
establish a rule of international law, such as would satisfy 
a lawyer treating the Treaty of Rome simply as an 
international legal instrument. But they do point us to a 
new perspective on the Draft Treaty, regarding it as an 
integrating step in constitutional history: a "heroic" 
revolutionary act.
Drawing on these historic exmples, we would like to suggest a 
few principles, some negative and some positive, that might 
serve to distinguish cases in which majoritarian treaty 
amendment may be permitted. We do not want to obscure the 
fact that this construct involves an illegality. A 
revolution, even if "heroic," remains a rupture of the legal 
order. What we are aiming at is a set of guidelines that, 
while acknowledging the illegality of a proposed action, 
would define conditions under which could be justified. 
While each one of these principles is necessarily somewhat 
ambiguous, cumulatively they may provide a framework for 
analyzing this and future initiatives.
1. The new legal order principle. The essence of this 
principle is not novelty, but a change so fundamental that it 




























































































may be difficult to specify the elements of a "fundamental" 
change. It can hardly be denied, however, that a 
restructuring of the entire institutional structure of the 
Community is "fundamental." As we have suggested above, of 
course, it would be dangerous to allow anyone advocating a 
new legal order to neglect Article 236(EEC). The principles 
listed below are intended to avoid including such initiatives 
as the Genscher-Colombo proposal.
2. The proposed change must not detract from the acquis of 
the Community. This principle receives considerable support 
from the law of treaties, which must be interpreted in light 
of their aims and objectives. As one of the goals of the 
Treaty of Rome is to foster an "ever-closer union among the 
peoples of Europe"(Preamble), an amendment that furthers 
that ideal, even though it deviates from Article 236(EEC), 
constitutes less of a rupture to the Community legal 
order.(36)
3. The proposed change must not be forced on the minority. 
The Member States who opt out must have their rights under 
the old Community respected. This stipulation raises the 
issue of the relations between the Community and the Union, 




























































































4. The interests of democratic government must be preserved. 
In some ways, the Draft Treaty can lay claim to greater 
legitimacy than either the American Constitution or the Swiss 
Constitution. The commission that drafted the Swiss 
Constitution was appointed by cantonal representatives to the 
Diet; the Framers of the American Constitution by state 
legislatures. By contrast, the European Parliament that 
provided the impetus for the Draft Treaty was directly 
elected by the citizens of the Member States. The 
ratification procedure established in Article 82, moreover, 
would confer a democratic authority on the Treaty equal to 
that of the American and Swiss Constitutions. Both broke from 
the procedures established in the preceding constitutional 
orders, reducing the unanimity requirement to some degree of 
majority; all three derive their authority from ratification 
by overwhelming majorities in democratically elected 
legislatures.
Though comparisons of the procedure for ratification embodied 
in Article 82(DT) and the Swiss and American precedents are 
persuasive, the yardstick of legitimacy must ultimately be 
Article 236(EEC). By this standard, as well, majority 
ratification of the Draft Treaty satisfies the requirements 
of democratic legitimacy. As Madison pointed out in The 
Federalist (no. 40), the interests of democracy are not 




























































































population, can block the will of the rest. The unanimity 
requirement in the Community confers a veto on one nation 
with a population smaller than that of Florence, a country 
representing 0.13% of the combined population of the Common 
Market. As one writer puts it, a "mutual veto...represents 
negative minority rule."(37) The example of Switzerland 
again bears directly on the issue; the Radical authors of 
the 1848 Constitution likewise "se persuadaient facilement 
qu’en brusquant la légalité formelle du droit positif, ils ne 
feraient que sévir la légitimité. Pour eux, le principe de 
la légitimité, c'était la souveraineté du peuple. Il était 
donc illégitime de mantenir une confédération d'Etats qui 
était à leurs yeux la négation même du peuple suisse et dont 
ce peuple, dans sa grande majorité, ne voulait plus"(38).
To be sure, majoritarianism does not represent the sole 
democratic value. Constitutions protect minorities on 
certain issues from the will of the majority. Likewise, 
divisions of competence in a federal or confederal system 
protect the minority that inhabits a given territorial 
division from the will of the federal or confederal majority 
as regards certain issues,(39) either because they are 
believed to be particularly local in character or because 
they are most efficiently managed at that level. The 
principle of minority protection, however, must be balanced 




























































































case of freedom of speech, a minority of one must be 
permitted to assert his right against the rest of society. 
We believe that the kind of right protected by Article 
236(EEC), however, should not be guaranteed to that extent.
Article 236(EEC) gives a minority of one Member State a right 
to the maintenance of the particular institutional division 
established in the Treaty of Rome. The ideal division of 
competences in a federal or confederal system, however, is 
not subject to a theoretical analysis. Instead, it reflects 
an empirical judgment in light of values that shift over 
time.(40) The relativism of each division of competences 
suggests that a given institutional structure should not be 
fixed immutably. This is especially true in the Community, 
where the"democratic unit"(41), the Member State, is an 
historical accident, not a rational division designed to 
maximize democratic values and efficiency. Since no 
reordering of national boundaries in Europe is in the offing, 
the Draft Treaty has tried to accommodate the conflicting 
demands of a democracy of nations and a democracy of peoples. 
From this vantage point, the unfairness of Article 236's 
unanimity requirement emerges. Although it may be 
"undemocratic" to proceed from one stage of integration to 
another without the consent of all parties to the original 
agreement, to provide otherwise prevents the majority from 




























































































that moment of time—  division of competences within the 
federal or confederal system. The right to make such a 
choice is fundamental to democratic values, and should not be 
subject to "negative minority rule."
The principles we have tried to elaborate may bear practical 
fruit. The authors of the Draft Treaty provide for unanimous 
amendment (Art. 84). Our construction of the European Union 
as a further move away from an outmoded view of the Community 
as a simple international organization towards a European 
federation suggests tht we look again at the historical 
examples of the United States and Switzerland. Both the 1787 
and the 1848 Constitutions, adopted against the prevailing 
legal requirements, established the possibility of 
majoritarian amendment.(42) If the illegality of the Article 
82(DT) procedure is to be justified on the basis of 
fundamental democratic values applicable to nation-states, 
those values should likewise be incorporated in the Draft 
Treaty's amendment procedure. It would be more consistent, 
in this regard, to redraft Article 84(DT) to permit majority 
amendments, but this solution would clash with the 
requirements that certain measures be taken unanimously.(43) 
It would be anomalous to permit a majority to make amendments 
that would be more important than legislation requiring 
unanimity. The anomaly would be mitigated by incorporating 




























































































satisfied in addition to two-thirds (or some other fraction) 
approval. These principles, however, are not readily 
justiciable, and they might prove vulnerable to manipulation. 
It seems more realistic to preserve the unanimity 
requirement, recognizing that pressure may someday build 
towards another illegal but "revolutionary" step in European 
integration.
Legal Construct No. 7; Whatever the legal and political 
justifications for a transition from European Community to 
European Union under the Draft Treaty, we may have to 
confront, in Europe, the possibility of two institutions 
existing side-by-side. Such a Europe "a deux vitesses" 
constitutes the most likely solution to the practical problem 
of guaranteeing the rights of Member States that do not feel 
ready to take the next step in European integration.(44) It 
should be emphasized, however, that this practical political 
solution does not resolve the legal issue posed by a treaty 
that deals with fields in which the Member States have 
transferred their sovereignty to the European Community and 
adopted outside the amendment mechanisms of the Treaty of 
Rome.
Europe has experimented before with parallel institutions. 
The practical inefficiency of this solution was recognized in 




























































































institutional structure of the three European Communities. A 
similar redundancy endures, however, in the separation 
between the European Political Cooperation and the European 
Council. While that system has led to such absurdities as 
dividing meetings between Copenhagen and Brussels, it has 
nevertheless survived. This fact suggests that, for all its 
inefficiency, a coexisting Community and Union may prove a 
viable transitional solution.(45) Of course, we realise that 
the difficulties in coordinating the Union and the Community 
would be far greater than those encountered so far in the 
Community's experiments with parallel institutions. 
Substantial revision of the Draft Treaty would be required, 
and even then it is difficult to imagine what mechanisms 
might be required. Ehlermann(46) suggests that the Treaty of 
Rome is flexible enough by itself to accomodate two speeds, 
and that incorporation of the "deux vitesses" idea in a 
separate treaty is therefore unnecessary. He may be right; 
but the Treaty provisions he points to may also be taken as 
proof that drafting the technical provisions for coordinating 
two institutions is feasible.
The other solution that has been suggested,(47) to negotiate 
some form of association between the Union and the diminished 
Community, offers both advantages and disadvantages. It is 
appealing because it would eliminate a great deal of 




























































































were members of both the Community and the Union might 
someday be subject to conflicting obligations. The 
association solution is risky, however, even as a theoretical 
proposal, because it presupposes that the Union members could 
withdraw from the still-extant Community. As noted above, we 
must avoid at all costs arguments that put at risk the 
already consolidated gains of the Community.
Conclusion
Throughout this discussion we have tried to be sensitive to 
the distinction between the legal and the political issues 
surrounding the implementation procedure envisaged by the 
Draft Treaty establishing the European Union. We realize 
fully that the legal issues we have examined are liable to be 
subsumed in a political accord or lost in the shuffle of 
political controversy; still, analysis of legal arguments at 
this stage of the game may prevent them from becoming 
political weapons. Ironically, however, perhaps the most 
fruitful legal construct for interpreting and justifying the 
Draft Treaty's departure from the terms of Article 236 EEC 
has proved to be precisely the one that draws most heavily 
from political theory. This is true for two reasons. The 
other possible constructs we have discussed, especially those 
that apply to the probable scenario of partial ratification, 




























































































in principle. Second, a political analysis is intuitively 
more appropriate to the revolutionary nature of the 
enterprise at hand. It is fitting, when considering an effort 
as great as that of proceeding from a "European 
Confederation" to a "European Union," to recall the basic 























































































































































































1. The following combinations would meet the requirements of 
Article 82: Any combination of six states including all of 
the Big Four; Any combination including three of the Big Four 
and Denmark; Any combination including Italy, France, and 
Germany or the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany; Any 
combination including the United Kingdom, France, Germany and 
Greece or Belgium. If the United Kingdom, France, and Italy 
adhere, but not Germany, any combination must include the 
Netherlands or any of the following pairs: Greece and 
Denmark, Greece and Belgium, Denmark and Belgium. It is 
impossible for any combination of six Member States to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 82 unless it includes 
three of the Big Four. Source for population figures: 
Countries of the World and their Leaders: Yearbook 1984
(Detroit 1984) .
2. For the sake of simplicity we shall deal only with the 
EEC; most issues are similar in the ECSC and Euratom. Cf. 
Article 96 ECSC and Article 204 Euratom.
3. One example of such a treaty is the recently concluded Law 
of the Sea Convention. For a discussion of the roles of the 
Community and the Member States in that treaty, see, Gaja, 
The European Community's Participation in the Law oF~the Sea 
Convention: Some Incoherencies in a Compromise Solution, in 5 
Italian Yearbook ô? Int ' 1. ITT 110 ( 1980-81 ) . The issues 
raised by partial ratification of the Draft Treaty have been 
discussed by Nickel, Le projet de traité instituant l'Union 
européenne élaboré par le Parlement européen" forthcoming in 
Cahiers de Droit Européen ; Lodge, Freestone and Davidson, 
Some Problems of the Draft Treaty on European Union, 9 Eur. 
lT Rev. 3Ô7 ( 19 8 4 f; Groupe d'études politiques européenne s, 
L'Union européenne: le projet du Parlement européen après 
Fontainebleau (19Ô4 ) ; de Saint-Mihiel, Le projet de traité 
instituant ï 1 2345Union européenne, R .M .C . No. 276, IT9 (1984); 
Catalano, The European Union Treaty: Legal and Institutional 
Legitimacy, Crocodile, No. ÏTJ 5 (June 1983); Jacqué, The 
European Union Treaty and the Community Treaties, Crocodile, 
No. 11, 1 (June 19Ô3).
4. The juxtaposition of an imperative "shall meet at once" 
and the facultative "by common accord" is a classical way of 
reconciling incompatible interests. For a similar formulation 
cf. Art. 169(EEC).
5. Ehlermann, Die Rolle der Juristen im Rechtsetzungsprozess 





























































































6. Though in both these cases constitutional changes altered 
the complexion of the nation, unifying Italy and 
partitioning Germany.
7. Ilké, How Nations Negotiate 202 (1964).
8. Weiler, The Community System; The Dual Character of 
Supranationalism, 1 Yearbook of European Law 267 (1981).
9. Whether the Community is an international organiation 
subject to international law or a hybrid form of quasi- 
federal state, subject only to its own, internal 
constitutional law is an issue that has excited endless 
debate. See, e.g., Dagtoglou, La nature juridique de la 
Communauté européenne, in Trente Ans de Droit Communautaire 
35 ( 19Ô2 ) . This lis not the place for a full discussion of 
that issue. Suffice it to say that legal constructs to 
justify the implementation of the Draft Treaty should not 
carry the Community backward by stressing its foundations in 
international law.
10. For example, the OECD supplanted the OEEC without 
following the organic amendment procedures contained in the 
OEEC. See, Jacqué, supra, at 7; Pescatore, L'Ordre juridique 
des Communautés européennes 62-63 (2d ed. 1973).
11. The Convention on Common Institutions was signed with 
the Treaties of Rome. Although it modified portions of the 
ECSC Treaty, no-one objected that Art. 96 ECSC had been 
breached. Catalano, supra, at 2. The "acceleration 
decisions" of the 1960's furnish another parallel. In 
Commission v. Italian Republic, Case 38/69 (1970) E.C.R. 47, 
Italy claimed that an acceleration decision modifying the 
terms of the Treaty of Rome had the status of an 
international agreement such as those foreseen by Articles 20 
and 220(EEC). The Court of Justice disagreed, rejecting 
Italy's claim that her declarations at the time of the 
decisions operated as a reservation to an international 
instrument. See, Pescatore, The Law of Integration 67 
(Leiden 1974).
12. See, e.g., Schwarze, Ungeschriebene 
Geschaftsfuhrungsbefugxsse fur die Kommissien bei Untatigkeit 
des Rates? Zum Fischerei-Urteil des EuGH v.5.5.19811, TT 
Europarecht 133 (1982); Bernhardt, Les sources du droit 
communautaire: la "constitution" de la Communauté, in Trente 
Ans de Droit Communautaire 73, 80-81 (19Ô2). But cf., Lodge, 
Freestone, and Davidson, supra, at 393-95.





























































































14. In this discussion we deal only with Article 236(EEC). 
Another actor is involved in the Coal and Steel Community; 
Article 96(ECSC) requires an opinion on proposed amendments 
from the Court of Justice.
15. The Draft Treaty's concern for continuity manifests 
itself especially in Article 7, entitled "The Community 
Patrimony."
16. Cf. Article 208 of the Euratom Treaty. Article 97 of the 
ECSC treaty limits that treaty to a term of 50 years.
17. See, e .g., Akehurst, Withdrawal from International
Organisations, in Current Legal Problems 1979 143, 151
(London 1973). Accord, Note, Hill, The European Economic 
Community: The Right of Member State Withdrawal, 12 Ga. J7
Int'1. & Comp. L. 335 ( 1982) .
18. Dagtoglou, How Indissoluble is the Community?, in Basic
Problems of the European Community 258 (Oxford 1975). See 
also, Dagtoglou, La nature juridique de la Communauté 
européenne, supra, note Ôa, at 4~2 ( 1982 ) ; Lasok and Bridges, 
Introduction to the Law and Institutions of the European 
Communities 25 (2d ed. 1976), who agree that a Member State
may withdraw "as long as the political integration of the 
economic community into a more homogeneous body politic has 
not materialised." Bernhardt, supra, note 11, at 85 (1982) 
assumes that withdrawal would be legal when he remarks that 
withdrawal of a Member State that has failed to maintain a 
democracy would be "desirable."
19. Id. at 259-260.
20. Case 7/71 (1971) E.C.R. 1003, 1018. Cf., Hill, supra.
21. Article 56(1) reads:
A treaty which contains no provision regarding its 
termination and which does not provide for denunciation 
or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or 
withdrawal unless:
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit 
the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied 
by the nature of the treaty.
By its terms, the Vienna Convention applies only to treaties 
entering into force after the Convention itself. As the 
Convention was conceived as largely a codification of 
existing international law, its provisions may still guide 
our discussion.
22. Article 56(1)(b) does not state an entirely different 




























































































concrete form the concept that the nature of some treaties 
may give rise to a presumption that the Contracting Parties 
intended to include a right of withdrawal.
23. E.g. Akehurst, supra.
24. This situation is, of course, purely hypothetical. It is 
as unlikely that only one Member State would oppose the Draft 
Treaty as it is that Luxembourg would be the one to do so.
25. Nickel, Le projet de traité instituant l'Union 
européenne élaboré par le Parlement européen forthcoming in 
Cahiers <3ë Droit Européen ( 1984 ) ; Catalano, supra, at 2; 
Jacqué, supra, at 7.
26. Insofar as the envisaged jurisdiction of the Union 
comprises subject matters that fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Community, the principle of preemption 
precludes the Member States from entering into agreements 
in those areas. To the extent that the new Treaty deals with 
matters over which the Member States have concurrent 
competence, the agreement would risk violating the principle 
of supremacy. We have warned all along that certain 
rationales for justifying Art. 82(DT) may risk doing grave 
harm to the Community acquis ; this legal construct, which 
suggests that the transfer of sovereign powers from the 
Member States to the Community may be revoked at any time, 
could wreak havoc on the existing Community structure.
27. The sort of principle that we are referring to clearly 
straddles the domains of law, philosophy and political 
science. Such principles are nonetheless "legal" principles; 
indeed, they are essential elements of the legal edifice. 
The law must turn to fundamental principles when confronted 
by the "hard" cases that cannot be resolved by the usual 
legal methods. See, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London 
rev'd ed. 1978).
28. The controversies leading to the final version of the 
Articles is recounted in detail by Jensen, The Articles of 
Confederation (Madison 1948).
29. The classic picture of a nation paralyzed by the 
weakness of its central government, painted by Fiske, The 
Critical Period of American History 1783-1789 (Boston and New 
York 1888), has been much disputed in recent years. See, e.g. 
Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During 
the Confederation 1781-178$ (New York 1950); Morgan, The 
Birth of the Republic 1763-1789 (Chicago rev'd ed. 1977). 
Still, the consensus survives that the Confederation was 




























































































and commercial policy, and by its lack of power to collect 
taxes.
30. The two states were, apparently, well aware that their
agreement was illegal. Farrand, The Fathers of the
Constitution 100-101 (New Haven 1921).
31. Only five states were represented at the Annapolis 
Convention. The failure of this Convention, it has been 
suggested, was deliberate; it highlighted the need for 
radical, rather than incremental, change and provided an 
excuse to call the Constitutional convention. Id_. at 101-103.
32. Congress' resolution read, in part:
Whereas, there is provision in the Articles of 
Confederation and perpetual Union, for making 
alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the 
United States, and of the legislatures of the several 
States ...
Resolved, - /That a convention be assembled/ ... for the 
sole and express purpose of revising the articles of the 
Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several 
legislatures such alterations and provisions therein, as 
shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the 
States, render the federal Constitution adequate to the 
exigencies of government and the preservation of the 
Union.
The Annapolis call was similar, calling for a convention
to devise such further provisions as shall appear to 
them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal 
government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and 
to report such an act for that purpose, to the United 
States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, 
and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every 
State, will effectually provide for the same.
Quoted by Madison in The Federalist, No. 40.
33. Gilliard, A History of Switzerland 91 (Westport Conn. 
1978) .
34. Calgari and Agliati, 2 Storia della Svizzera 216-18 
(Bellinzona 1969).





























































































36. C£. Bernhardt, Les sources du droit communautaire; la 
"constitution" de la Communauté, Tn Trente Ans de Droit 
Communautaire 73, 8l (1902).
37. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies 36 (New Haven 
1977 ) .
38. Bridel, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel Suisse 46-47 
(1965) .
39. See, Cappelletti, Seccombe, and Weiler, Introduction,
Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal
Experience, vol. 1, book 1. (Forthcoming).
40. Dahl, Federalism and the Democratic Process, in Liberal 
Democracy, NOMOS XXV 95 (Pennock and Chapman eds. 191T3 ) .
41 • IÉ*
42. Art. V, U.S. Constitution; Arts. 104-107, 1848 Swiss 
Constitution. The failed 1832 amendment to the Federal Pact 
also permitted amendment by a majority of the cantons.
43. See, for example, Article 68.2(DT), under which the 
Council- of the Union, by unanimous vote, can authorize a 
Member State to derogate from measures taken by common 
action.
44. This assessment does not mean that we neglect the
complexities of the "two-speed" concept, elaborated by 
Ehlerman, How Flexible is Community Law? An Unusual Approach 
to the Concept of "Two Speeds*', 82 Mich. L R e v .  12 7 4 ( 1984). 
See also, Langeheine, Abgestufte Integration, 18 Eur. R. 227 
T 1983 ) ; Grabitz and Langeheine, Legal Problems Related to a
Proposed "Two-Tier____ System" of Integration Within the
European Community, 18 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 33 (1981) . If, is 
Ehlermann suggests, a "two-speed Europe" would only be 
workable under an amended Treaty of Rome, we would be back 
once more to Article 236(EEC). The political forces 
surrounding the technical amendments necessary to implement a 
two-speed Europe would be different than those that might 
prohibit implementation of the Draft Treaty via Art. 
236(EEC). The most obvious reason is that unanimous approval 
of the Draft Treaty, in its present form, would leave no 
options for Member States that wish to "stay behind," while 
such technical amendments would be designed precisely to 
provide those options. Moreover, the political objections 
raised above to implementation— albeit unanimously— by Art. 
236(EEC) would not apply to such amendments.
45. In any case, these precedents show that coexistence 






























































































47. Jacqué, supra, at 8; Groupe d'études politiques 





















































































































































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE EUROPEAN POLICY UNIT
EUI Working Papers:
No. 139: Orstrom Moller Financing European Integration: 
The European Communities and the 
Proposed European Union.
No. 140: John Pinder Economic and Social Powers of 
the European Union and the 
Member States : Subordinate or 
Coordinate Relationship?
No. 141: Vlad Constantinesco La Repartition des Competences 
Entre l'Union et les Etats 
Membres dans le Projet de Traité 
Instituant l'Union Européenne.
No. 142: Peter Bruckner Foreign Affairs Powers and 
Policy in the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union.
No. 143: Jan De Meyer Belgium and the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union.
No. 144: Per Lachmann The Draft Treaty Establishing 
the European Union: 
Constitutional and Political 
Implications in Denmark.




























































































No. 14 6 : John Temple-Lang
No. 147: Carl Otto Lenz
No. 148: David Edward, Richard
McAllister, Robert 
Lane
No. 151: Jacques Genton
No. 153: Gianfranco Pasquino
and Luciano Bardi
No. 154: Joseph Weiler and
James Modrall 
Forthcoming:
No. : Susan Senior-Nello
No. : Elfriede Regelsberger,
Philippe C. de 
Schoutheete, Simon
The Draft Treaty Establishing 
the European Union and the 
Member States: Ireland.
The Draft Treaty Establishing 
the European Union: Report on
the Federal Republic of Germany 
The Draft Treaty Establishing 
the European Union: Report on
the United Kingdom.
Problèmes Constitutionnels et 
Politiques Posés en France par 
une Eventuelle Ratification et 
Mise en Oeuvre du Projet de 
Traité d'Union Européenne 
The Institutions and the Procès 
of Decision-Making in the Draft 
Treaty.
The Creation of the Union and 
Its Relation to the EC Treaties
EEC-East European Economic 
Relations : Industrial
Cooperation Agreements.
European Political Cooperation: 




























































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the European 
University Institute, Florence.
Copies can be obtained free of charge —  depending on the availability 
of stocks —  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole(FI) 
Italy



























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 3/85
To : The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole(FI) 
Italy
From : Name........................... .
Address...........................






























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
EUI WORKING PAPERS
1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries
2: Joseph H.H. WEILER Supranationalism Revisited 
Retrospective and Prospective. The 
European Communities After Thirty 
Years
3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates
4: Mauro CAPPELLETTI/ 
David GOLAY
Judicial Review, Transnational and 
Federal: Impact on Integration
5: Leonard GLESKE The European Monetary System: Present 
Situation and Future Prospects
6: Manfred HINZ Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der 
national-sozialistischen Architektur
7: Wilhelm BURKLIN The "Greens" and the "New Politics": 
Goodbye to the Three-Party System?
8: Athanasios MOULAKIS Unilateralism or the Shadow of 
Confusion
9: Manfred E. STREIT Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy of 
an Abstraction
10:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics




On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution
13:Gunther TEUBNER Reflexive Rationalitaet des Rechts
14:Gunther TEUBNER Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law
15:Jens ALBER Some Causes and Consequences of Social 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
16:Ian BUDGE Democratic Party Government: Formation 
and Functioning in Twenty-One 
Countries
17:Hans DAALDER Parties and Political Mobilization: An 
Initial Mapping
18:Giuseppe DI PALMA Party Government and Democratic 
Reproducibility: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies
19:Richard S. KATZ Party Government: A Rationalistic 
Conception
20:Juerg STEINER Decision Process and Policy Outcome: 
An Attempt to Conceptualize the 
Problem at the Cross-National Level
21:Jens ALBER The Emergence of Welfare Classes in 
West Germany: Theoretical Perspectives 
and Empirical Evidence
22:Don PATINKIN Paul A . Samuelson and Monetary Theory
23:Marcello DE CECCO Inflation and Structural Change in the 
Euro-Dollar Market
24:Marcello DE CECCO The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in 
the '20s and the '70s
25:Manfred E. STREIT Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of 
Analytical Inquiry
26:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe - 
Prospects and Repercussions
27:Terence C. DAINTITH Legal Analysis of Economic Policy
28:Frank C. CASTLES/ 
Peter MAIR
Left-Right Political Scales: Some 
Expert Judgements
29:Karl HOHMANN The Ability of German Political 
Parties to Resolve the Given Problems: 
the Situation in 1982
30:Max KAASE The Concept of Political Culture: Its 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
31:Klaus TOEPFER Possibilities and Limitations of a 
Regional- Economic Development Policy 
in the Federal Republic of Germany
32:Ronald INGLEHART The Changing Structure of Political 
Cleavages Among West European Elites 
and Publics
33:Moshe LISSAK Boundaries and Institutional Linkages 
Between Elites: Some Illustrations 
from Civil-Military Elites in Israel
34:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Modern Macroeconomic Theory: An 
Overview
35:Richard M. GOODWIN/ 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Economic Systems and their Regulation
36:Maria MAGUIRE The Growth of Income Maintenance 
Expenditure in Ireland, 1951-1979
37:G. LOWELL FIELD/ 
John HIGLEY
The States of National Elites and the 
Stability of Political Institutions in 
81 Nations, 1950-1982
38:Dietrich HERZOG New Protest Elites in the Political 
System of West Berlin: The Eclipse of 
Consensus?
39:Edward 0. LAUMANN/ 
David KNOKE




Class and Prestige Origins in the 
American Elite
41:Peter MAIR Issue-Dimensions and Party Strategies 
in the Irish republic, 1948-1981: The 
Evidence of Manifestos
42:Joseph H.H. WEILER Israel and the Creation of a Palestine 
State. The Art of the Impossible and 
the Possible
43:Franz Urban PAPPI Boundary Specification and Structural 




Zur Implementation von 
Gerichtsurteilen. Hypothesen zu den 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
45:Alexis PAULY/ 
René DIEDERICH
Migrant Workers and Civil Liberties
46:Alessandra VENTURINI Is the Bargaining Theory Still an 
Effective Framework of Analysis for 
Strike Patterns in Europe?
47iRichard A. GOODWIN Schumpeter: The Man I Knew
48-.J.P. FITOUSSI/ 
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Réduction de 
la Durée du Travail
49:Bruno DE WITTE Retour à Costa. La Primauté du Droit 
Communautaire à la Lumière du Droit 
International
50:Massimo A. BENEDETTELLI Eguaglianza e Libera Circolazione dei 
Lavoratori: Principio di Eguaglianza e 
Divieti di Discriminazione nella 
Giurisprudenza Comunitaria in Materia 
di Diritti di Mobilità Territoriale e 
Professionale dei Lavoratori
51:Gunther TEUBNER Corporate Responsability as a Problem 
of Company Constitution
52:Erich SCHANZE Potentials and Limits of Economic 
Analysis: The Constitution of the Firm
53'.Maurizio COTTA Career and Recruitment Patterns of 
Italian Legislators. A Contribution of 
the Understanding of a Polarized 
System
54:Mattei DOGAN How to become a Cabinet Minister in 
Italy: Unwritten Rules of the 
Political Game
55:Mariano BAENA DEL ALCAZAR/ 
Narciso PIZARRO




Preferences in Policy Optimization and 
Optimal Economic Policy
57:Giorgio FREDDI Bureaucratic Rationalities and the 
Prospect for Party Government
59 : Christopher Hill/ 
James MAYALL




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
- 5 -
60:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Adjusting to Competitive Depression. 
The Case of the Reduction in Working 
Time
61:Philippe LEFORT Idéologie et Morale Bourgeoise de la 
Famille dans le Ménager de Paris et le 
Second Libro di Famiglia, de L.B. 
Alberti
62:Peter BROCKMEIER Die Dichter und das Kritisieren
63 : Hans-Martin PAWLOWSKI Law and Social Conflict
64:Marcello DE CECCO Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s
65:Gianpaolo ROSSINI Intraindustry Trade in Two Areas: Some 
Aspects of Trade Within and Outside a 
Custom Union
66:Wolfgang GEBAUER Euromarkets and Monetary Control : The 
Deutschemark Case
67:Gerd WEINRICH On the Theory of Effective Demand 
under Stochastic Rationing
68 :Saul ESTRIN/ 
Derek C. JONES
The Effects of Worker Participation 




On the Formalization of Political 
Preferences: A Contribution to the 
Frischian Scheme
70:Werner MAIHOFER Politique et Morale
71 : Samuel COHN Five Centuries of Dying in Siena: 
Comparison with Southern France
72:Wolfgang GEBAUER Inflation and Interest: the Fisher 
Theorem Revisited
73:Patrick NERHOT Rationalism and the Modern State
74:Philippe SCHMITTER Democratic Theory and Neo-Corporatist 
Practice





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
76:Richard GRIFFITHS Economic Reconstruction Policy in the 
Netherlands and its International 
Consequences, May 1945 - March 1951
77:Scott NEWTON The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British 
Policy towards European Integration
78:Giorgio FODOR Why did Europe need a Marshall Plan in 
1947?
79-.Philippe MIOCHE The Origins of the Monnet Plan: How a 
Transistory Experiment answered to 
Deep-Rooted Needs
80:Werner ABELSHAUSER The Economic Policy of Ludwig Erhard
81:Helge PHARO The Domestic and International 
Implications of Norwegian 
Reconstruction
82:Heiner R. ADAMSEN Investitionspolitik in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1951
83:Jean BOUVIER Le Plan Monnet et l'Economie Française 
1947-1952
84:Mariuccia SALVATI Industrial and Economie Policy in the 
Italian Reconstruction
85:William DIEBOLD, Jr. Trade and Payments in Western 
Europe in Historical Perspective : 
A Personal View By an Interested 
Party
86:Frances LYNCH French Reconstruction in a European 
Context
87:Gunther TEUBNER Verrechtlichung. Begriffe, Merkmale, 
Grenzen, Auswege
88:Maria SPINEDI Les Crimes Internationaux de l'Etat 
dans les Travaux de Codification de la 
Responsabilité des Etats Entrepris par 
les Nations Unies
89:Jelle VISSER Dimensions of Union Growth in Postwar 
Western Europe
90:Will BARTLETT Unemployment, Migration and 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
91:Wolfgang GEBAUER Kondratieff's Long Waves
92:Elisabeth DE GHELLINCK/ 
Paul A. GEROSKI/
Alexis JACQUEMIN
Inter-Industry and Inter-Temporal 









Community, Market, State- and 
Associations. The Prospective 
Contribution of Interest Governance 
to Social Order
95:Nigel GRIFFIN "Virtue Versus Letters": The Society 
of Jesus 1550-1580 and the Export of 
an Idea
96:Andreas KUNZ Arbeitsbeziehungen und 
Arbeitskonflikte im oeffentlichen 
Sektor. Deutschland und 
Grossbritannien im Vergleich 1914-1924
97:Wolfgang STREECK Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations 
and the Economic Crisis in West 
Germany
98:Simon A. HORNER The Isle of Man and the Channel 
Islands - A Study of their Status 
under Constitutional, International 
and European Law
99:Daniel ROCHE Le Monde des Ombres
84/100:Gunther TEUBNER After Legal Instrumentalism?
84/101:Patrick NERHOT Contribution aux Débats sur le Droit 
Subjectif et le Droit Objectif comme 
Sources du Droit
84/102:Jelle VISSER The Position of Central Confederations 
in the National Union Movements
84/103:Marcello DE CECCO The International Debt Problem in the 
Inter-War Period
84/104:M. Rainer LEPSIUS Sociology in Germany and Austria 1918- 
1945. The Emigration of the Social 




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
Development of Sociology in Germany 
after the Second World War, 1945-1967
84/105:Derek JONES The Economic Performances of Producer 
Cooperations within Command Economies: 
Evidence for the Case of Poland
84/106:Philippe C. SCHMITTER Neo-Corporatism and the State
84/107:Marcos BUSER Der Einfluss der Wirtschaftsverbaende 
auf Gesetzgebungsprozesse und das 
Vollzugswesen im Bereich des 
Umweltschutzes
84/108:Frans van WAARDEN Bureaucracy around the State:Varieties 
of Collective Self-Regulation in the 
Dutch Dairy Industry
84/109:Ruggero RANIERI The Italian Iron and Steel Industry 
and European Integration




A Non-Linear Model of Fluctuations in 
Output in a Mixed Economy
84/112:Anna Elisabetta GALEOTTI Individualism and Political Theory
84/113:Domenico Mario NUTI Mergers and Disequilibrium in Labour- 
Managed Economies
84/114:Saul ESTRIN/Jan SVEJNAR Explanations of Earnings in 
Yugoslavia: The Capital and Labor 
Schools Compared
84/115:Alan CAWSON/John BALLARD A Bibliography of Corporatism
84/116 : Reinhard JOHN On the Weak Axiom of Revealed 
Preference Without Demand Continuity 
Assumptions
84/117:Richard T.GRIFFITHS/Frances The FRITALUX/FINEBEL Negotiations
M.B. LYNCH 1949/1950
84/118:Pierre DEHEZ Monopolistic Equilibrium and 
Involuntary Unemployment
84/119:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic and Financial Evaluation of 
Investment Projects; General 




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
84/120:Marcello DE CECCO Monetary Theory and Roman History
84/121 : Marcello DE CECCO International and Transnational 
Financial Relations
84/122:Marcello DE CECCO Modes of Financial Development: 




Multisectoral Models and Joint 
Production
84/124:John FARQUHARSON The Management of Agriculture and 
Food Supplies in Germany, 1944-47
84/125:Ian HARDEN/Norman LEWIS De-Legalisation in Britain in the 
1980s
84/126:John CABLE Employee Participation and Firm 
Performance. A Prisoners' Dilemma 
F ramework
84/127:Jesper JESPERSEN Financial Model Building and 
Financial Multipliers of the 
Danish Economy
84/128:Ugo PAGANO Welfare, Productivity and Self- 
Management
84/129 :Maureen CAIN Beyond Informal Justice
85/130:0tfried HOEFFE Political Justice - Outline of a 
Philosophical Theory
85/131:Stuart J. WOOLF Charity and Family Subsistence: 
Florence in the Early Nineteenth 
Century
85/132:Massimo MARCOLIN The Casa d'Industria in Bologna during 
the Napoleonic Period: Public Relief 
and Subsistence Strategies
85/133:Osvaldo RAGGIO Strutture di parentela e controllo 
delle risorse in un'area di transito: 
la Val Fontanabuona tra Cinque e 
Seicento
85/134:Renzo SABBATINI Work and Family in a Lucchese Paper- 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
85/135:Sabine JURATIC Solitude féminine et travail des 
femmes à Paris à la fin du XVIIIème 
siècle
85/136 : Laurence FONTAINE Les effets déséquilibrants du 
colportage sur les structures de 
famille et les pratiques économiques 
dans la vallée de l'Oisans, 18e-19e 
siècles
85/137:Christopher JOHNSON Artisans vs. Fabricants: Urban 
Protoindustrialisation and the 
Evolution of Work Culture in 
Lodève and Bédarieux, 1740-1830
85/138:Daniela LOMBARDI La demande d'assistance et les répon­
ses des autorités urbaines face à 
une crise conjoncturelle: Florence 
1619-1622
85/139:Orstrom MOLLER Financing European Integration: 
The European Communities and the 
Proposed European Union.
85/140:John PINDER Economic and Social Powers of the 
European Union and the Member States : 
Subordinate or Coordinate Relation­
ship
85/141:Vlad CONSTANTINESCO La Repartition des Competences 
Entre l'Union et les Etats Membres 
dans le Projet de Traite' Instituant 
l'Union Européenne.
85/142:Peter BRUECKNER Foreign Affairs Power and Policy 
in the Draft Treaty Establishing 
the European Union.
85/143:Jan DE MEYER Belgium and the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union.
85/144:Per LACHMANN The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union:
Constitutional and Political 
Implications in Denmark.
85/145:Thijmen KOOPMANS The Judicial System Envisaged in 
the Draft Treaty.
85/146 :John TEMPLE-LANG The Draft Treaty Establishing the 




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE March 1985
States : Ireland
85/147:Carl Otto LENZ The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union: Report on the Fede­




The Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union: Report on the United 
Kingdom
85/149:Joseph J. M. VAN DER VEN Les droits de l'Homme: leur universa­
lité' en face de la diversité' des 
civilisations.
85/150:Ralf ROGOWSKI Meso-Corporatism and Labour Conflict 
Resolution
85/151 :Jacques GENTON Problèmes Constituionnels et Politi­
ques poses en France par une éventuel­
le ratification et mise en oeuvre du 
projet de Traite d'Union Européenne
85/152:Marjanne de KWAASTENIET Education as a verzuiling phenomenon 
Public and independent education in 
the Nederlands
85/153 Gianfranco PASQUINO 
and Luciano BARDI
The Institutions and the Process of 
Decision-Making in the Draft Treaty
85/154:Joseph WEILER
and James MODRALL
The Creation of the Union and Its 
Relation to the EC Treaties
85/155:Franqois DUCHENE Beyond the first C.A.P.
85/156:Domenico Mario NUTI Political and Economic Fluctuations 
in the Socialist System
85/157:Gianfranco POGGI Niklas Luhmann on the Welfare State 
and its Law
85/158:Christophe DEISSENBERG On the Determination of Macroeconomic 
Policies with Robust Outcome
85/159:Pier Paolo D 'ATTORRE ERP Aid and the Problems of 
Productivity in Italy during the 1950s























































































































































































'7.-1 • -■ • ' *  ■■'• ?  ■>; ; I ■ i : »  ;v - ï f  'V-'.- -'U" ''
m  ■ : : - ,--M wvr. 1
V:VV J 1' ̂  '■ ' 4
>y?L . ̂  V J  ̂ V 1 1r7*s ' >■» V • 5 v ! v ,k 'AV''/ Jyr; )
" ■- 'sY^ •> -; -x', . '" ' ,' ,' v -' ' f ■
. - - ' - - ■^ ■*??̂.' , ' >ÂV' lot ,v" 'V<, '>"s v I .(-̂  ̂i :*i.,<>\ V. e-7 : HîJ • *». «y (V/ . • ̂  •***. V-. r Y.' v Vv / •. ' uY •.. W ' aV" • /
s.r ,7 V ' ’ V, r  . .N < -Krr'j V . * ;  ■ ,> , vW .V i  '
rv
i ' ; - V
*1 V i- ■ V
,































































































( ' C ' l i
.
[  A
t  ,  . ’4
% -
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
